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
## Introduction: What Is Lyric Philosophy?

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# In Focus: Reflections on Lyric Philosophy

WARREN HEITI

## INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS LYRIC PHILOSOPHY?

**Abstract.** What is lyric philosophy? The clearest response to that question is the book-length investigation by Canadian philosopher and poet Jan Zwicky. If philosophy can be defined as thinking in love with clarity, then lyric philosophy might be roughly understood as such thinking in which clarity assumes the form of resonance. Among her paradigmatic lyric philosophers, Zwicky includes (inter alia) the aphorists Herakleitos and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Lyric is distinguished by its deep structure, which is polydimensional and integrative. Epistemically, this structure responds to the gestural root of meaning, which is ineffably manifest in the physical world.

**W**HAT IS LYRIC PHILOSOPHY? The clearest response to that question consists in roughly six hundred pages: a book-length meditation that incorporates the philosophical forms of aphorism and dialogue and the musical form of polyphony in an integrative effort to show what it means: namely *Lyric Philosophy*, by the Canadian philosopher, poet, and musician Jan Zwicky.<sup>1</sup> Importantly, criteria for the concept of lyric philosophy are never stipulated in that book, and refraining from such stipulation is connected with the very nature of the investigation. “Lyric meaning,” writes Zwicky, “is proto-linguistic. It underlies and informs linguistic meaning but is, at the same time, broader in scope. Its root is

gestural.”<sup>2</sup> Appreciating the centrality of this issue—the gestural root of lyric meaning—is indispensable for appreciating both the book’s other themes and its unorthodox format. Conversely, understanding *how* the format enacts the book’s central issue cannot be dis severed from an understanding of the nature of lyric meaning itself. “Form and content are inextricably bound up with one another—how you say is what you mean” (“L&E,” §8.32).

The ineffability of musical gestures is anticipated by the book’s first epigraph, from Ludwig Wittgenstein: “It is impossible for me to say one word in my book about all that music has meant in my life; how then can I possibly make myself understood?”<sup>3</sup> This epigraph must, I think, address any of us who have had the experience of finding some music deeply meaningful and yet failing to fit any words to it. Such an experience might be shelved as a mere curiosity if music’s resistance to linguistic articulation were trivial or unique. But it isn’t: a few moments of reflection suggest that it shares this feature with many other phenomena. Consider loving someone; being in the presence of beauty; bearing witness to atrocity. Or pausing on a gravel road at twilight, caught in the gaze of a deer. Sitting down at the kitchen table, after a death, and trying to write an adequate letter of sympathy. Trying accurately to describe something relatively commonplace, but specific, like the sound of a clarinet, or the aroma of coffee. *Why* can’t it be done?

In one sense, this question motivates Zwicky’s entire investigation. Let me set the question beside her more moderate revision of (the early) Wittgenstein’s well-known aphorism: some things, she suggests, “can be more clearly shown than said” (“L&E,” p. 65). And the way that music means is a clue: “It doesn’t mean the same way as language does. Music’s meaning is a function of resonance and resonance involves a kind of integrity.”<sup>4</sup> Discussing these two characteristics—resonance and integrity—will assist us in fleshing out the nature of lyric philosophy. But I want to say that my aim here is not to provide an exegetical commentary on Zwicky’s written work. (An introduction has already been provided by the recent anthology *Lyric Ecology*.<sup>5</sup>) Instead, my aim is to direct our attention to the practice of (lower-case) lyric philosophy, and what that practice wants to understand. Zwicky’s work is one of the most original and elucidatory defenses of that practice; but it is, also, an exemplary contribution to it. She is responsible for, among other things, having offered the practice an apt name, and having performed the service of perspicuously collecting more than a few members of its family. But if she is right, then the practice itself is at least as old as Herakleitos

and Lǎo Zi. And all of its practitioners would agree, I think, that it is a mistake to fixate on written work, instead of turning to that toward which the work is gesturing.

## I

I emphasized the book's format; let me say a few words about it. Each two-page spread is composed as a structural unit, which has been called a "duon." On the left hand, one finds text authored by Zwicky (which is not itself monologic, since it moves around and splits, questions itself, impersonates a variety of interlocutors with different tones of voice, some impatient, others sympathetic, for example); on the right hand, one finds excerpts from texts by analytic, continental, and lyric philosophers, musical scores, paintings, photographs, et cetera. Zwicky writes, "The right-hand text is a scrapbook; a way of paying intellectual debts; a series of suggestions for further reading; a chorus of *agents provocateurs*; the vocal score for a conceptual opera; a homage.... The relation of the two texts to one another is somewhere between counterpoint and harmony, somewhere between a double helix and the allemande of the earth and moon" (*LP*, foreword). In a study of the book's structure, Toronto's first poet laureate, Dennis Lee, writes, "It's hard to believe, when printed books have been around for almost six hundred years in the West, that someone could look at their physical structure and construe its logic differently. But that is what Zwicky has done.... to see that a work of philosophy can proceed both contrapuntally (left/right on each duon) *and* sequentially (page one to the end)—that appears to be something new."<sup>6</sup>

Lee's insight is significant and on the right track, but let us notice that the book exhibits more *kinds* of motion than the "double momentum" that he stresses in his study. For example, within the counterpoint of any given duon, in the left or right entry, there may be an *intra*-textual dialogue: the left-hand text may be questioning itself, or members of the right-hand chorus may be harmonizing or disagreeing with one another. Equally importantly, some of the echoes between disparately placed entries move along an axis *at an angle different from* either the contrapuntal or the sequential axes. (For example, the eighth Oxherding Picture [*LP*, R150] rhymes with the single page of silence [R249]; as the reader's mind comes to rest, it also arcs backward, and across the intervening pages the two moments are instantaneously associated.)

Let me focus on one particular duon, which addresses the following ancient question: what is philosophy? Zwicky suggests a response:

Philosophy is thinking in love with clarity. (L18)

We might notice, among other things, the generosity of the suggested definition. As Zwicky emphasizes elsewhere, it is intended “to include thought such as Herakleitos’s, as well as that of the best twentieth-century Anglo-American analysts” (“L&E,” p. 67). (This inclusivity is important. Zwicky repeatedly cautions that she is not attempting to supplant analysis with lyric [*LP*, L75], and her work might be read as reminding philosophy of the range of its indigenous resources.) The accuracy of the definition can be tested by its ability to save the phenomena, to save what we already recognize as philosophy while also inviting us to extend recognition to cases that have been neglected or marginalized. And we might notice something else about the definition: it is sonorously composed; listen: it rings, not unlike a tintinnabulum. Such sonority is another test of truth in a lyric context. Zwicky sets the definition beside a poem by the Canadian poet, typographer, and linguist Robert Bringhurst:

Poem About Crystal

Look at it, stare  
 into the crystal because  
 it will tell you, not  
 the future, no, but  
 the quality of crystal,  
 clarity’s nature,  
 teach you the stricture  
 of uncut, utterly  
 uncluttered light. (R18)<sup>7</sup>

The poem is both a meditation on the clarity with which philosophical thinking is in love and an illustration (in the original, etymological sense) of such thinking. What, exactly, is clarity’s nature? The poem offers one response. Something that we might notice about its single sentence is the intense concentration—of imagery and music, diction and rhythm. At its geometrical center, the ray of the opening monosyllables flares briefly into a three-syllable pattern (*quality, clarity, utterly, uncluttered*), which straitens, finally, into a consonant echo of the poem’s first word (*look, light*). Clarity is not simple, but uncomplicated: whole.

Thinking can pass through the poem intact and enhanced. The world, writes Zwicky, “finds voice in the music of Bringhurst’s work as carbon becomes articulate in diamond.”<sup>8</sup>

This pair of texts—Zwicky’s aphoristic definition of philosophy on the left-hand page and Bringhurst’s poem on the right-hand page—also shows us one of the forms that clarity can assume: resonance (*LP*, L48). A contrasting form of clarity, the one with which many twenty-first-century Anglophone philosophers are more comfortable, is, of course, analysis. For our purposes, it will be helpful to focus on two of the characteristic features that Zwicky identifies: (1) “a methodology that, for the most part, appears ... to proceed on the assumption that *understanding* is a function of breaking a whole into its component parts, plus the view that such a breaking, in the case of ideas, is not attended by any loss of meaning”; and (2) “an insistence on the generic superiority of the rational intellect to emotions, desires, and ‘the body’” (“L&E,” §2.13).

We may call the first feature (1) “analytic method,” and the second feature (2) “hierarchical dualism.” Both receive a definitive modern formulation in the work of Descartes. Cartesian mind-body dualism will be familiar from the *Meditations* (especially *Meditations Two* and *Six*). For a prototype of the analytic method, two key texts are his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* and *Discourse on Method*. The method is most succinctly articulated in the second and third rules of the second part of the *Discourse*: “The second was to divide each of the difficulties which I encountered into as many parts as possible, and as might be required for an easier solution. // The third was to think in an orderly fashion when concerned with the search for truth, beginning with the things which were simplest and easiest to understand, and gradually and by degrees reaching toward more complex knowledge, even treating, as though ordered, materials which were not necessarily so” (*LP*, R13). According to this method, clarity is achieved by analyzing what we want to understand into its simplest parts and then ordering those parts systematically—even when this ordering is unnatural.

These different forms of clarity are responsive to different sorts of structures. A pocket watch is a good physical analogue of an analytic structure. When the hairspring wears out, a technician can take the watch apart, remove the expired spring, replace it with a fresh one, and reassemble the watch. The character of each part is independent of its relations with the other parts. —But that’s an exaggeration: the hairspring *is* a hairspring because of its mechanical rôle in regulating another part, the balance wheel. —What I mean is that the technician,

during the surgery, can select more or less arbitrarily among the things in the drawer labeled “hairsprings.” Logico-analytic arguments should work in this way, too: we should be able to abstract from any stylistic particulars and paraphrase the thing purely, for example in unornamented prose, or in symbols. And such representations can be very useful for achieving a clarifying overview of some argumentative structures.


But Bringhurst’s poem resists that kind of representation. The following exercise can be instructive: try replacing any given word in the poem with a randomly selected synonym. For example, try replacing “nature” with “essence.” Connotatively, the replacement makes the poem sound more scholastic than it means to be. (On the one hand, we should not forget that its subject matter is a humble member of the mineral world; on the other, we should not forget its assertion that this crystal can be the perceiver’s teacher.) And, equally importantly, the replacement also disrupts more than one musical pattern (for example, *future, nature, stricture*).

Another exercise: try paraphrasing the whole poem: “If one regards the crystal, one will not obtain information about prospective time. However, one will obtain information about the clear, inorganic substance itself: it is precisely regular, and that regularity implies that it is effective at transmitting the agent that stimulates the sense of vision, which agent is complete and absolutely tidy.” Of course, some paraphrases are better than others, and I trust that more than a few of us can agree that this one is especially bad. Whatever the thought, it is more clearly embodied in, enacted by, Bringhurst’s gesture. We might say that his poem has integrity.

“Resonance is a function of the integration of various components in a whole” (L34). When they stand in an appropriate relationship—when they are integrated, or attuned—distinct components can transit vibrations to each other. And to permit of integration, the whole itself needs to be complex or “polydimensional” (L5). Here it is worth remembering, as one model of polydimensionality, the many different axes of motion exemplified by Zwicky’s book: contrapuntal *and* sequential *and* dialogic *and* echoic, et cetera. (For the sake of contrast, we might ask: is “integration” imaginable for a unidimensional object? Would it make sense to claim that the conclusion of a valid argument “resonates” with its premises?) Another illustration of gestural integrity, which I set beside Bringhurst’s, is a photograph by Ansel Adams (R259).<sup>9</sup>

For the sake of discussion, we might discern at least three distinct components in the photograph (while noting that it is possible to discern





*Aspens, Northern New Mexico, 1958*

Photograph by Ansel Adams

more or less than three, or to study the photograph along different axes): the tall aspen trunks in the background, the medium aspen tree in the left foreground, and the smaller one in the right foreground. (Alternatively, one could say that the trunks in the background keep a steady beat, which is punctuated by the trochee of the two trees in the foreground.) Regarding the aspen on the left, it would not be hyperbolic to call it “luminous.” However, it would be a mistake to become absorbed solely with this particular aspen. For we fail to appreciate the photograph when we fail to appreciate that it is not restricted to a single focal point. Indeed, it is not symmetrically composed, but balanced: the brightly leaved trees in the foreground balanced against the darkly slender trunks at the back; the blazing aspen on the left, against the flickering one on the right.

The balancing, or integration, of these several dimensions, and the resonances among them, lend the photograph *depth*. (Compare the



composition of Jean Renoir's shots—their deep focus and depth of field—in *La règle du jeu* [see R258].) We can see, especially from the lost leaves of the smaller aspen, that it is autumn; yet the two trees in the foreground are comparatively young. The overwhelming impression conveyed by the photograph is of something fiercely alive and simultaneously on the very cusp of snuffing out. (What Zwicky calls “the preciousness and losability” [L243] of things, and what Sue Sinclair discusses, in her contribution to this section of *Philosophy and Literature*, in response to a cherry tree.) Like Bringhurst's poem, Adams's photograph makes a resonantly integrated gesture.

Zwicky's metaphors—polydimensionality, integrity, and resonance—are admittedly abstract. (For the usefulness of the first and last metaphors, compare Charles H. Kahn's two fundamental principles for reading the philosophy of Herakleitos: “density” and “resonance.”<sup>10</sup>) And the concept of a “resonance-body”—a resonantly integrated, polydimensional whole—can range widely, from ontological structures (for example, ecological communities) to works of art in diverse media (Zwicky's many examples include Vermeer's interiors, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, the string quartets of Mozart, and Woolf's novels, to name a few). But the roots of these metaphors are not esoteric; they are *physical*. When the concept of resonance is introduced, via an entry from *The Oxford Companion to Music* (LP, R5), what is remarkable is the deference to physics.

Elsewhere, Zwicky writes that stringed instruments are “good physical analogues” of some kinds of “lyric structures.”<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the Greek etymology of “lyric” might remind us of a specific stringed instrument, one which features in an aphorism by Herakleitos: “They do not comprehend: quarrelling with itself the logos accords: it is a back-turning attunement, like the bow and the lyre.”<sup>12</sup> For the purposes of the analogy, let us imagine the lyre's distinct strings, and its two curved horns, as the relevant components of the whole. The horns, back-turning and pulling the yoke in opposite directions, sustain the tension of the strings, permitting them to be tuned in relation to each other. When the complex structure is in tune—integrated—it is capable of resonance.

—But how is the lyre different from the pocket watch? When one component, such as the hairspring, goes “out of tune”—when it wears out, goes slack—the complex malfunctions. (And don't the strings of the lyre, like the parts of the watch, need occasionally to be replaced?) Isn't the pocket watch, then, also a “resonantly integrated, polydimensional whole”? —Let me shift the analogy slightly, to another of Zwicky's examples: one could say that a chord *is* its component tones; and there

is no hierarchy of importance among these tones: each makes an indispensable contribution, in collaboration with its brothers and sisters, to the identity of *this* chord. (Compare, while also noting the differences among, a chord, an organism, a family, an ecological community.)

Can one say the same of the pocket watch and its parts? Does it depend on whether, for example, one is approaching the watch primarily as a time-telling mechanism or as a fragile artifact? We speak of understanding something in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which means the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (According to legend, when Charlie Parker arrived at a gig at Massey Hall in Toronto in 1953, he had pawned his saxophone. Somehow, in the nick of time, a cream-colored acrylic alto was found for him. One might say that Parker's saxophone could, and could not, be replaced.) I am not trying, here, to establish a categorical difference between lyric structures and analytic ones; for the moment, I want only to suggest that some thinking—lyric thinking—is more chord-like than device-like, and that different forms of clarity are appropriate in response to different contexts. Some things—whose way of meaning is *like* the way that music means—can be more clearly shown through resonant gestures than through those that foreclose on resonance.

It is in this way, then, that philosophy might assume lyric form: when thought whose eros is clarity is driven also by profound intuitions of coherence—when it is also an attempt to arrive at an integrated perception, a picture or understanding of how something might affect us as beings with bodies and emotions as well as the ability to think logically...

When philosophy attempts to give voice to an ecology of experience.  
(*LP*, L68)

## II

There is more than one path through the woods of the book: as Zwicky hints in the foreword, it is a book about time; it is a new sort of overview of Wittgenstein's work; it is a respectful quarrel with Anglophone philosophy's recently exclusive commitment to systematic analysis. And what was not appreciated by any of the book's first commentators, but has since been emphasized by many of Zwicky's ensuing essays and by a few more recent commentaries, is that the book is also a contribution to ecological ethics. (A first move in the long argument for this claim is her suggestion that ecological structures are lyric structures. "The

coherence that lyric awareness intuitively, and that lyric thought attempts to render, is ecological in form" ["L&E," §8.16].) I have said almost nothing about these major themes, concentrating instead on the comprehensive issue of lyric meaning.

In different ways, Sue Sinclair's and Tanis MacDonald's contributions to this section can be read as addressing the first and third themes listed above: the theme of time and the theme of philosophical alternatives to analysis. In her essay "Lyric, Time, Beauty," Sinclair asks, explicitly, about the relations among lyric thinking, beauty, and time. Can lyric thinking be beautiful? Does it, like beauty, offer some relief from time? How can it, when it seems sensitive to, inflected by, the mortality of things? And what about geometrical thinking, which emerges as a contrasting case in its alleged freedom from time: can't it be beautiful, too? We find that none of lyric, geometry, and beauty are identical with one another; but it seems that there are lyric and geometrical *species* of beauty.

Sinclair illustrates these different species with examples: a cherry tree and the Pythagorean theorem, respectively. And she begins her meditation by focusing on a poem (specifically, on the first stanza of Zwicky's "Night Driving"), which embodies both lyric insight and beauty. "Just as an ecologist attends," writes Zwicky, "to the millions of organisms, microorganisms, and nonorganic beings and processes that make the beach the living entity that it is, so the serious reader of integrated thought must pay attention to the microcomponents that produce that thought's stability and integrity."<sup>13</sup> An accomplished poet as well as a philosopher, Sinclair draws the reader's attention to patterns among the microcomponents of Zwicky's poem.

At the end of the essay, a reader is still left with the Socratic question, "What is beauty?" A Platonically inclined reader will want to know what, exactly, the cherry tree shares with the Pythagorean theorem. The appreciator of the tree, like that of the theorem, is relieved of time, but differently: the appreciator of the tree remains sensitive to the losability or mortality of the tree, while the appreciator of the theorem senses that it is unlosable or immortal. But what is beauty? Is it a common, objective property of both the tree and the theorem? If yes, then why would it be losable in one case, but unlosable in the other?

The Socratic question does not, of course, require a Platonic answer. One might, for example, sketch a Wittgensteinian response: beauty is not a common, objective property, and is not detachable from the tree and the theorem; it is a family resemblance—a resonance—between these particular things, but is not itself a third, metaphysical thing. But if one

accepts this sort of response, one will have more difficulty explaining the sense in which geometrical beauty is immortal.

Through a study of two of Zwicky's poems, "Five Songs for Relinquishing the Earth" and "Epistemology," MacDonald compares Zwicky's concept of relinquishing with Simone Weil's concept of decreation. Relinquishing, for Zwicky, seems to involve acknowledging the losability of things: "Loss is perhaps the ultimate philosophical problem ... The great absolute architectonics of systematic thought are intended to secure the *world* against loss. Maturity is achieved when things are let go, left to be on their own, allowed their specificity ..." (*LP*, L89). Weil's concept of decreation is crucial for her philosophy, but it is complex, and arguably not static across the remarks scattered through her *Notebooks*. The concept is difficult to track, and one has the impression that it is imagined by Weil in ways that are not always consistent: ideally it is a relaxed detachment, a form of selflessness, but seems occasionally to be conflated with muscular effort to eradicate the self. Zwicky is not uncritical of Weil's asceticism, and suggests that "in regard to *herself* she did not have sufficient detachment."<sup>14</sup> Is there an instructive dissonance between Zwicky's relinquishing and Weil's decreation?

Zwicky's poem "Epistemology" is, among other things, a sympathetic meditation on Wittgenstein's remark: "If you do know that *here is one hand*, we'll grant you all the rest."<sup>15</sup> A little philosophical background might be helpful. Wittgenstein is responding to the British philosopher G. E. Moore, who, in turn, is responding to the skeptic. Recall that Moore's "proof" of an external world goes roughly like this: here is one hand (accompanied by the gesture of displaying his hand); here is another (ditto); therefore, external things exist. Wittgenstein is intrigued, but believes that Moore has profoundly missed the main point. The skeptic is calling into question my knowledge (or, in other moods, the existence) of the whole external world; so it is illicit for me to cite, as evidence, my knowledge (or the existence) of some item *in* that world.

The upshot is that the skeptic cannot be answered in the *way* that Moore tried to answer; much of what we acknowledge is not founded in the language-games of rationalistic justification to which the skeptic is (tacitly) committed. In the Western analytic tradition, knowledge has standardly been defined as (some version of) justified true belief. While Zwicky's anaphoric refrain "because" seems to allude to the provisioning of justification, what she offers—for example, "my body / was a flock of horned larks and my bones were / bells"<sup>16</sup>—would pose a radical challenge to an analytic epistemologist. (As an aside, let me note that

Weil was rigorously trained in the history of philosophy, and wrote her dissertation on Descartes. While she is a genuinely original thinker, her work strongly exhibits the influence not only of ancient Greek Platonism and Stoicism, but also of early modern rationalism. To the extent that her philosophy is, also, ecstatic, it needs to be contextualized within this complex inheritance.)

Lucy Alford's essay—"We Know It in Our Bones: Reading a Thirty-Five-Acre Plot in Rural Virginia with Three Poems by Charles Wright"—mentions neither Zwicky's name nor the word "lyric," and yet it is paradigmatically a work of lyric philosophy. Importantly, it is not only a piece of scholarship—an insightful study of Wright's poetry—but also a work of art in its own right, taking its place beside the art of which it is a study. The approach is unconventional: it does not conform to the argumentative model that dominates most philosophical and literary writing in the academy. The organic whole of the essay is what Zwicky would call a lyric structure (that is, a resonantly integrated, polydimensional structure), in which the reader's thought moves by resonant, non-sequential associations, in contrast to the ultimately sequential developments followed by a conventional argument. In more concrete terms, the essay addresses itself not only to the single dimension of the reader's reasoning mind, but also to her mind's eye, her ear, her kinesthetic sense—to her body.

Alford's compositional method is especially significant because the essay's subject matter is itself lyric: both the place (Edgewood) and the suite of Wright's poems are complex wholes, each of which integrates a diversity of "formal elements" ("light, topography, perspective, air quality, scents, colors, vegetation, weather patterns, and sounds" and "line length and breakage, vocalization, rhythm and rhyme, sonority and visual layout," respectively). The essay thus does justice to its subject matter by recognizing and enacting, through its own form, the form of that subject matter. At a climax, the essay witnesses the physicality of these formal elements: "So the poetics of a place and the placedness of poetry seem to rest in the same physical qualities, the body of the thing."

A not-dissimilar thought is articulated by the early Wittgenstein, in his so-called picture theory of linguistic meaning: that language manages to mean by sharing a *form* with what it means. Moments of Wright's poetry and Alford's essay seem in sympathy with Wittgenstein's insistence that such form cannot itself be represented *in* language (any more than the anatomical structure *of* a body can be contained *in* the body as one of its parts). But what is original with Alford is the further thought that the

formal elements shared by a poem and a place are *physical*. By the time that the reader reaches this epiphany, she has already been prepared by the essay-length demonstration: the essay has done for Alford's place, Edgewood, what Wright's poems have done for his place, a backyard in Charlottesville, and the Chickamauga Creek in Tennessee. The essay has attuned itself to Edgewood by using formal elements that are themselves physical, rhythmical, musical, imagistic. Again, it is crucial to stress that the method is not *expository*, but *enactive*. The thought is not merely asserted and then explained; instead, it is shown, and the reader is enabled to experience it, through the rhythms of the writing.

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1. Jan Zwicky, *Lyric Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Kentville: Gaspereau Press, 2011); hereafter abbreviated *LP*; the letters "L" and "R," prefixed to numbers, refer to left- and right-hand pages, respectively. After the final draft of this essay was completed, a third edition was published: Jan Zwicky, *Lyric Philosophy* (Edmonton: Brush Education, 2014).
2. Jan Zwicky, "Bringham's Presocratics: Lyric and Ecology," §2.1, in *Poetry and Knowing*, ed. Tim Lilburn (Kingston: Quarry Press, 1995), pp. 65–117; hereafter abbreviated "L&E." (A version of the essay is printed, with errors, in *Terra Nova* 1, nos.1–2 [1995–96]: 42–58, 77–98.) The quoted remark is an extension of *Lyric Philosophy*, 1st ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), L251.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, reported by M. O'C. Drury in *The Danger of Words* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. xiv; quoted in *LP*, n.p. See also Jan Zwicky, "The Geology of Norway: Poem with Introduction," *The Harvard Review of Philosophy* 7 (1999): 29–34.
4. Jan Zwicky, "The Details" (interview with Jay Ruzesky), *The Malahat Review* 165 (December 2008): 92–97 (92).
5. Mark Dickinson and Clare Goulet, ed., *Lyric Ecology: An Appreciation of the Work of Jan Zwicky* (Toronto: Cormorant Books, 2010). See especially Dennis Lee, "The Music of Thinking: The Structural Logic of *Lyric Philosophy*," pp. 19–39; Carolyn Richardson, "Talk About Talk," pp. 40–49; Steven Burns, "A Note on 'Trauermusik,'" pp. 76–80; and Sue Sinclair, "Wisdom," pp. 157–65.
6. Lee, "The Music of Thinking," p. 38.
7. Robert Bringham, "Poem About Crystal," *Selected Poems* (Kentville: Gaspereau Press, 2009), p. 20. Reprinted by permission of the author.
8. Jan Zwicky, quoted on the back cover of Robert Bringham, *The Calling* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995).

9. *Aspens, Northern New Mexico, 1958*. Photograph by Ansel Adams. Collection Center for Creative Photography, University of Arizona © 2013 The Ansel Adams Publishing Rights Trust. Used by permission.
10. Charles H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 89; quoted in *LP*, R23. Compare with Jan Zwicky, "Oracularity," *Metaphilosophy* 34, no. 4 (July 2003): 488–509 (500, n. 23).
11. Jan Zwicky, "Being, Polyphony, Lyric: An Open Letter to Robert Bringhurst," *Canadian Literature* 156 (Spring 1998): 181–84 (183).
12. Herakleitos, Diels-Kranz 22B51; translated after Kahn, *The Art*, pp. 64–65, 195–200. The (generally unacknowledged) original of Herakleitos's metaphor of the bow and the lyre seems to be Homer, *Odyssey*, 21.404–411.
13. Jan Zwicky, "Bringhurst's Presocratics: Lyric and Ecology (Part I)," *Terra Nova* 1.1 (1995): 43. Compare with *LP*, L112.
14. Jan Zwicky and Tim Lilburn, *Contemplation and Resistance: A Conversation* (LaRonge: JackPine Press, 2003), p. 10 *verso*. The book is now out of print, but part of it is reprinted in *Lyric Ecology*, pp. 142–50.
15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), §1.
16. Jan Zwicky, "Epistemology," *Robinson's Crossing* (London: Brick Books, 2004), p. 17.